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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Book Removal in Secondary Schools: A Violation of
the First Amendment?
Board of Education v. Pico
457 U.S. 853 (1982)
N THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, it is not uncommon for small,
publicly-elected bodies to control the workings of societal institutions. These
bodies may be federal, state or local in realm and function, and are usually
given wide discretion.I But who is it that controls the actions of these bodies?
This question is paramount to the myriad of recent cases involving the removal
of books from secondary school libraries.' The body involved is the local school
board - an elected unit charged with the duty of managing school affairs.3
In that process of management, however, local school boards are apparently
not sovereign." In Board of Education v. Pico,I a suit brought originally in
1979 by junior high and high school students in New York, it was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States that students are entitled to first amendment'
protection of their "right of access to information" which is not to be infringed
upon by the denial of access to ideas with which the board disagrees.' In Pico,
this access occurs in the form of books acquired for the school library which
are subsequently removed under the discretion of the school board.
'See, e.g., President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); James
v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh. den., 410 U.S.
947 (1973).
2See generally, Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982);
Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw
Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th
Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); President's Council,
Dist. 25 v. Community Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Sheck v. Bailey School Comm., 530
F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right
to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
'The responsibility for public education in the United States rests with the individual states which in turn
usually delegate administrative responsibility to locally elected bodies commonly known as school boards.
Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1092, 1095 (1980).
'See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
'Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
'The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press." It applies to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
1457 U.S. at 866.
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This case, like others before it,8 concerns a conflict between the discre-
tion vested by the state in the school board and the limitations established by
the United States Constitution. 9 It is an example of the classic struggle between
the recognition of individual rights and the powers of an administrating body.'0
Board of Education v. Pico is only the latest in a line of cases which attempt
to establish and define the first amendment rights of students."I It was hoped
that the Supreme Court's decision in Pico would put an end to the controver-
sies involving the removal of library books from school shelves. The Court's
treatment and resolution of the issue, however, was not conclusive, and its in-
fluence on similar controversies is unclear. In the end, seven separate opinions
were filed. '2 The justices were unable to establish whether the right of access
to information exists, nor could they agree upon a clear standard of review
to guide federal courts in similar disputes. Due to this lack of cohesion, the
substantive issues were left unsettled, and the way is clear for further debate.
The dispute in Pico began when the Island Trees Union Free School District
Board of Education ordered nine books'3 removed from the shelves of elemen-
tary and secondary school libraries. The members of the school board had been
spurred into action when they saw the titles of these books on a list of "objec-
tionable" books at a conference sponsored by Parents of New York United
(PONYU), an educational organization considered politically conservative.' 4
The school board appointed a committee of parents and teachers to advise them
of the suitability of these books for secondary school students, and the com-
mittee suggested that only two of them be removed.' 5 The school board,
however, overturned or ignored the committee's recommendations for undis-
closed reasons. All nine books were removed for being what the board described
as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.'1 6 This
'See supra note 2.
'Langvardt, Not on Our Shelves: A First Amendment Analysis of Library Censorship in the Public Schools,
61 NEB. L. REV. 98, 135 (1982).
'Comment, Removal of Public School Library Books: The First Amendment Versus the Local School
Board, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1981).
"This litigation may be divided into areas of hair length cases, student suspension cases, control over
student newspaper cases, and library censorship cases. Courts have been divided in their treatment of the
constitutionality of such restrictions. See, J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, 98-108 (1974); Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); A. LEVINE, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: THE
BASIC A.C.L.U. GUIDE TO A STUDENT'S RIGHTS 25, at 31-32, 34-41 (1973); supra note 2.
"Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice Blackmun
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment
only..Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justices
Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor also wrote separate dissenting opinions.
"The books were: SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; THE NAKED APE, by Desmond Morris;
DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES OF NEGRO WRITERS, edited by
Langston Hughes; Go ASK ALICE, of anonymous authorship; LAUGHING Boy, by Richard Wright; A HERO
AIN'T NOTHIN' BUT A SANDWICH, by Alice Childress; and SOUL ON ICE, by Eldridge Cleaver.
4457 U.S. at 856.
"THE NAKED APE, by Desmond Morris and DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas, were found
unsuitable. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 391 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
"6Id. at 390.
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decision was reached by the board even though the parent-teacher committee
had suggested that the books be retained with only minimal supervision of the
students. 17
Five students'8 expressed their opposition by bringing suit in the Eastern
District Court of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section establishes
the illegality of and liability for acts done by the state which deprive citizens
of their constitutional rights. The local school board acts as an agency of the
state for this purpose. The students claimed their freedom under the first amend-
ment had been infringed upon by the board's decision, and they sought an
injunctive order forcing the board to return the books to the library and a
declaration that the removal was unconstitutional.' 9 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant school board stating that the
material was vulgar, and that the board's actions did not amount to a "sharp
and direct infringement of any first amendment right.""0 The court indicated
that although the removal was content based, the decision was based on the
board's "conservative educational philosophy" and not on religious principles.'
This decision was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which decid-
ed that the school board had failed its burden of showing a reasonable basis
for interfering with the students' rights.22 This burden was placed upon the
board because the circumstances surrounding the removal of the books were
so irregular. The appellate division held that the board had failed to meet its
burden and that the students should have "been offered an opportunity to per-
suade a finder of fact that the ostensible justifications for the school board's
actions . . . were simply pretexts for the suppression of free speech." 23 The
Supreme Court granted the school board's petition for certiorari."
The plurality opinion in Pico was written by Justice Brennan, who framed
the issue as "whether the First Amendment imposes limitations upon the exercise
by a local school board of its discretion to remove library books from high
school and junior high school libraries."2 5 If such limitation is found to exist
the court must then decide, in a light most favorable to respondent students,
if there was a question of fact as to whether the board exceeded those
limitations. 6 The plurality recognized that "school boards have broad discre-
"The committee recommended that SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE be made available to the students only with
parental approval. 474 F. Supp. at 391, n.10.
'The students were: Steven Pico, Jaqueline Gold, Glenn Yarris, Russell Rieger, and Paul Sochinski.
19457 U.S. at 859.
2 Id. at 860.
21474 F. Supp. at 392.
22457 U.S. at 860 (citing 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980)).
2 Id. (citing 638 F. Supp. at 414).
11457 U.S. at 861.
"Id. at 855-56.
161d. at 872.
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tion in the management of school affairs." 2" Justice Brennan also stated that
public schools are vital "in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens," and for "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system." 28 School boards are permitted to transmit
social, moral, and political community values, but the manner of that trans-
mission must comport with constitutional limitations. The Court quoted from
Ambach v. Norwick,29 but it did not accept the broader concept involved in
that case that education necessarily involves politics.30 The plurality in Pico
was adamant that political motivations are not to influence educational deci-
sions. Justice Brennan stated that the school board had "significant discretion
to determine the content of their school libraries... [b]ut that discretion may
not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner."'"
Relying largely on the rationales of a few landmark decisions, the Court
went on to explain why vigorous protection of constitutional rights is especially
important to the student. West Virginia v. Barnette32 dealt with a school board's
requirement that students salute the American flag while pledging allegiance,
and the Court held this requirement an infringement upon first amendment
freedoms. 3 In Epperson v. Arkansas34 a statute forbidding the teaching of evolu-
tion in the public classroom was held unconstitutional.3" The Pico Court was
especially dependent upon Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District. 36 In that case, public school students peacefully wearing black
arm bands as a vehicle for protest had been protected from school board
interference.II Tinker is often cited for its principle that student expression is
protected unless it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others." 3 Students possess rights which cannot
be curtailed merely because the administration deems it desirable. These cases
form the platform for the plurality's position that first amendment freedoms
fundamentally apply to secondary school students.
Justice Brennan stated that students' constitutional rights must be pro-
tected if we are not to "strangle the free mind at its source," 39 and to "safeguard
"Id. at 853.
2id. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
29441 U.S. 69 (1979).
10457 U.S. at 864.
"Id. at 870.
"319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"Id. at 642.
14393 U.S. 97 (1968).
"Id. at 109.
1-393 U.S. 503 (1969).
"Id. at 509.
"Id. at 513. Other language in Tinker suggests that in order to justify book removal in library censorship
cases, the board of education must demonstrate some state interest which is at least as substantial as theparticular "material and substantial" interests referred to in the so-called "Tinker test."
11457 U.S. at 853 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry.' Thus, at the outset
the Court addressed the conflict between the role of the administration and
the freedom of the individual. The Court has further stated that students do
not "shed their rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate'"4 ' and that "the First Amendment rights of students may be directly and
sharply implicated by the removal of books from the shelves of a school
library. ' '4
2
The specific first amendment right involved was described by the plurality
as "the right to receive ideas.'" 4 The Court found the origin of this idea in
cases involving the distribution of printed material." It flows from the right
of free speech and press which involves the sender as well as a willing
recipient. The plurality was convinced that such a right exists and has been
recognized by the Court in the past. In Stanley v. Georgia,'" an obscenity case,
Justice Brennan had stated that the right to receive publications is a fundamental
right." In Pico he attempted to apply this right to high school students. For
further support the Pico plurality looked to Griswold v. Connecticut7 in which
the Court observed that "[tihe State may not, consistently with the spirit
of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The
right to freedom of speech and press includes, not only the right to utter or
to print, but ... the right to receive, the right to read . . . and the right to
inquire .... -"4 The Griswold case, however, dealt with the distribution of
birth control information and like the other distribution cases, seems removed
from the rights of students and the privileges of the school administration.
Nevertheless, the Court in Pico held that this right to receive information
has special significance to secondary school students since freedom of access
"prepared students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, [and]
often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.""19 The
Court even recognized that the "special characteristics of the school
environment"5 " must be considered in the application of this right. It used this
to support its view by stating that students, more than anyone else, must be
allowed wide access to ideas and literature of all types.5
"°Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
"Id. (quoting, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
"Id. at 866.
"Id. at 867.
"See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965).
"'394 U.S. 557 (1969).
4 Id. at 564.
"381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"4Id. at 482.
"9457 U.S. at 868.
"Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
"Id.
Winter, 1984] RECENT CASES
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On another level, the Court was concerned because this case dealt with
school board intervention in an area of education - the school library - which
is an optional aspect of learning.5 2 Justice Brennan stated that "the libraries
afford [students] an opportunity at self-education and individual enrichment
that is wholly optional."" The Court held that while school boards have absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum, based upon "their duty to inculcate com-
munity values," '54 board attempts to invade the students free choice of leisure
reading, overstep acceptable bounds. The Court's emphasis upon the library
as "wholly optional" and as a "place to test or expand upon ideas presented
to . . [the student] in or out of the classroom"" is indicative of its view that
the student should be free to read whatever he likes in his free time and not
be restricted by an administrative review or community standards. Indeed, the
Court has stated that "[v]oluntary inquiry... holds sway" in this area. 6 This
theme of required versus optional reading, has been a recurring one in book
removal cases, and the Court has found that difference vital to its decisions.
Regarding Epperson and Barnette as its most solid basis concerning school
board function, the plurality recognized that "petitioners rightly possess signifi-
cant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. That discre-
tion, however, may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political
manner," 57 as "our constitution does not permit the official suppression of
ideas.""8 Finally, the Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact
remaining as to the school board's motive in the removal. If the board had
removed the books because they were educationally unsuitable or vulgar, it
would be beyond reproach. This determination was held to rest within the
boards' realm of regulation. 9 If, however, a board of education were to remove
books "simply because they dislike[d] the ideas contained in those books,"6
and by their removal hoped to instill their own personal values, morals and
philosophies upon the students, they would be found guilty of having infringed
upon the students' right of free access to ideas.6' Consequently, the petitioners
in Pico were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because
there remained "the possibility that petitioners' decision to remove the books
rested decisively upon disagreement with constitutionally protected ideas in those
5Id.
"Id. at 869.
"Id.
"Id. (quoting Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 715).
5Id.
"Id. at 870.
"Id. at 871.
"See, Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). "[S]o
long as the material removed are permissibly considered to be vulgar or indecent, it is no cause for legal
complaint that the Board members applied their own standards of taste about vulgarity." Id. at 441.
60457 U.S. at 872.
"Id. at 871.
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books." '6 2 Thus, the standard espoused by the plurality is to decide whether
a school board's motive in the removal was to deny students access to par-
ticular ideas with which the board disagreed, or whether the books were per-
vasively vulgar or educationally unsuitable. 3 In applying this standard, the Court
held that the Island Trees School Board was not entitled to a summary judg-
ment, and remanded the case for retrial on the merits."
Among the concurring Justices, Justice Blackmun also recognized the right
of students to receive information and ideas.6 5 He, however, did not believe
that the board must initially provide the information, and he provided a list
of more permissible motives for removal than had the plurality.6 6 Justice White
did not reach the constitutional issue as he believed the case should be
immediately remanded for a determination of the issues in dispute. 67 Because
Justice White took no position on the merits of Pico, no majority was formed
as to the existence of a first amendment right of access to information or the
standard of review.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor. Their first disagreement with the majority
concerned the existence of the right of access said to be enjoyed by secondary
school students.6 8 They contended that such a right had never been recognized
by the Supreme Court.6 9 Such a right would obligate school boards to actively
provide students with access to the type of literature in question.7" Since the
material was available elsewhere - in public libraries and bookstores - the
board need not be under such obligation.7 ' Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger
considered the removal of library books to be well within the scope of the school
board's duties, and that its discretion should not be fettered by the courts.72
The dissenting Justices felt that "in order to fulfill its function, an elected school
"Id. at 875.
6 Id.
"Id.
"Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He stated that "our
precedents command the conclusion that the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because
state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons." Id. at 879.
"He suggests that a school board may constitutionally remove books for reasons including relevancy to
the curriculum, quality of writing style, space and financial limitations, offensive language, themes which
are psychologically and intellectually inappropriate for the age group, and a number of other politically
neutral considerations. Id. at 880.
67Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
"Id. at 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"Id. The Chief Justice suggested that prior cases discussing a "right to receive information and ideas"
did not grant the "concommitant right to have those ideas affirmatively provided at a particular place
by the government." Id. He felt that since the school board is an elected body, it is, in essence, expressing
the views of the community. Id. at 889.
"Id. at 892.
7'Id.
"Id. at 893.
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board must express its views on the subjects which are taught to its students, ' 7 3
and that the courts should not be free to interfere.
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, warned that the plurality's decision
allows the students a great deal of control over what they would like to be taught.
All the students have to do is bring suit and have a judge review a board
decision. 7 This much freedom to the students could be more destructive than
the alternative. He also called the plurality's standard of review a "standardless"
one, as it offered little guidance in determining when a removal is conducted
in a "narrowly partisan or political manner." 7 Justice Powell also included
with his opinion an appendix containing disputed excerpts from the removed
books.76 His decision was obviously affected by the content of the disputed
books.
Justice Rehnquist was also adamant that the Supreme Court "has never
held that the First Amendment grants ... students a right of access to certain
information in school." ' "7 Besides, he stated, even a denial of access by removing
the material from the libraries was not a complete denial, and it should not
amount to a constitutional infringement.78 As all of the dissenting Justices
agreed, Justice Rehnquist believed that "education consists of the selective
presentation and explanation of ideas" and not of "free-wheeling inquiry." 79
The school board members, in his opinion, should be free to make educational
decisions based on their personal, social, political and moral views, since that
is precisely their function.8"
In her brief dissent, Justice O'Connor echoed the others by emphasizing
that the school board was acting well within its authority to remove the books,
and that there had been no infringement upon what she described, without
elaboration, as the student's right to read.8
If the plurality opinion in Pico is taken as the current view of the Supreme
Court in book removal cases, a plaintiff contending constitutional infringe-
ment must show that the removal was motivated by the intent to suppress ideas
and information politically unfavorable to the board members. The board must
then demonstrate that the material was vulgar or educationally unsuitable for
retention. The plurality is, however, only that - a plurality. Therefore, the
11Id. at 889.
'"Id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 895.
761d at 897-903.
"Id. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 908.
7'Id. at 914. Justice Rehnquist commented that "the First Amendment right to receive information simply
has no application to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective conveyance
of ideas." Id. at 915.
"Id. at 909.
"Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:3
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss3/6
major issues involved in this type of case are not satisfactorily resolved. First,
is there a right of access to information under the first amendment that applies
to secondary school students? On this point the Justices stood far apart in their
positions. The plurality stated that such a general right exists and is applicable.
Justice Blackmun, however, stated the right in narrower terms as the right not
to be denied access due to partisan political considerations. 82 Justice Rehnquist
suggested that no right of access was involved because the material was always
available elsewhere.
83
The other issue left unresolved is the applicable standard of review in book
removal cases. How will it be decided what motivations supported the removals,
and which of these motivations will be acceptable? Are vulgarity and unsuit-
ability the only permissible motives?8 ' None of the Justices suggested any means
for judging the merits of future cases or any standard by which to evaluate
the presented evidence. How much is required to prove that the board acted
within its capacity as the manager of educational affairs?
The plurality in Pico concluded that secondary school students enjoy a
constitutional right of access to information that is not to be infringed upon
by school boards which remove library books because of the ideas contained
in them.8" The Justices cited cases such as Epperson, Barnette, Meyer, and
Tinker in support of their position that school boards do not enjoy complete
discretion in the administration of educational affairs. Each of these cases dealt
with a different area of the educational process,8 6 but all have come to be
regarded as landmark decisions restricting the school board's exercise of its
authority. The deciding factor in each of these cases was the existence of first
amendment protection of a student's rights, and Pico elaborated on the ex-
istence of that right. The plurality in Pico described it as "the right to receive
information," and they cited cases such as Keyishian v. Board of Regents87
and Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee88 to demonstrate
the applicability of this right to secondary students. The plurality granted the
school board absolute discretion in matters involving curriculum and required
reading, but not in areas of optional participation such as the school library.
The plurality's distinction between required and optional material was not sup-
ported by any explicit precedent, but rather relied upon the historical role of
the local school board. It was held however, that the board may remove books
even from the "sacred" library if it considered them to be vulgar or unsuitable.
"Id. at 879.
"Id. at 913. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "the benefits to be gained from exposure to those ideas have
not been foreclosed by the State." Id.
"See supra note 65.
"1457 U.S. at 872.
"6Epperson involved teaching evolution; Barnette addressed the requirement of a flag salute; Meyer dealt
with the teaching of a foreign language; and Tinker involved students wearing black arm bands in protest.
"358 U.S. 589 (1966).
"1454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
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The Court vested the board with this decision. The problem is that if the board
reviews a book and finds it objectionable for any reason whatsoever, all it must
do is represent that the book was "educationally unsuitable." This behavior
would be beyond reproach by the law because the board has been granted this
discretion and because it would be impracticable to prove the actual motivation.
On the other hand, the dissenting Justices were concerned that preventing
a school board from removing books it found unsuitable would undermine
its authority. They felt that the board's duty to inculcate community values
was supreme. They failed to recognize, however, the distinction that the plurality
drew between required and optional material. They viewed the board either
as having authority over both or else saw no distinction. The dissenters also
disagreed that the right to receive information existed, and even if it did, they
did not believe it would apply to the realm of education. Perhaps they would
have done better to evaluate the students' rights according to the freedom of
expression doctrine. The students could be said to be protected by the right
to read what they wish, and such a right could not be infringed upon by the
board prescribing what was appropriate. Surely the dissenting justices must
have recognized that students enjoy freedom to express themselves.
In general, the Supreme Court in Pico delivered a disappointingly vague
opinion that offers little guidance for future cases. The Justices' opinions elo-
quently expressed the issues involved, 9 and did decide that the motives of the
school board in Pico were paramount and yet to be determined as a matter
of fact. They did not, however, provide much guidance for the lower court.
As it stands, each future case in the area of library censorship must be decided
on an ad hoc basis and revolve around the nebulous motivations behind the
removal.
The most gaping abyss in the Court's treatment of the Pico case was the
noncommital position regarding the role of a school board and the extent to
which it should be free from judicial review. The plurality as well as the dissenters
agreed that secondary school students should be free to express themselves
through activities, such as wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War,9°
that do not interfere with school procedures. Students should also be free to
refrain from participating in school activities such as flag saluting.9' But when
can a school board exert its authority to guide students in a direction that will
most effectively lead them through maturity and adulthood? Isn't a school board
elected to guide our country's children and to instill in them the community
values? Isn't it the manager of education? Surely a school board must be given
more trust than the plurality in Pico gave them. The judiciary should not be
"Those issues are optional versus required material, acquisitions versus removal of books, removal
procedures, constitutionality, and the role of the school board.
"Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
"Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
[Vol. 17:3
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so quick to intervene where discretion has already been vested. The Court did
suggest a distinction between optional and required material, but that stan-
dard is vague and subjective. A more objective standard of review is needed
in this area to clarify a school board's duties and function. The Supreme Court
was given this opportunity but it only demonstrated that the clash between a
school administration's power and an individual's freedom is still a strong one.
Library book removal cases such as Pico reveal this clash and have as their
core one of our most sacred institutions - education. Only more discussion
and exposure will narrow the gap between what the Supreme Court
demonstrated to be a wide rift in American opinion and philosophy. Board
of Education v. Pico will find its place beside Meyer, Tinker, Epperson, and
Barnette in the area of school board scrutiny and will be a widely cited source
for inevitable similar disputes.
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